WRONG ON ABORTION                      

Attorneys for the Roman Catholic Church and for those affiliated thereto [“RCC”] litigate to eliminate abortion and contraception coverage in employees’ group health insurance on behalf of the RCC only, thereby leaving all Prolife Catholics who are not RCC-employed unprotected! On the other hand on April 20, ‘16 Rockville Center NY Dioceses’ attorney Tom Renker asked, “Why are RCC attorneys judicially obligated to argue religious freedom [RF] as if it’s a privilege instead of a right?” In answer, to the contrary, I argue also why all employees have a right to RF which simultaneously makes abortion and contraception unconstitutional, explained as follows:   

I am a “federal civil service employee” defined as still under The Code of Ethics For Government Service[1] which says Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party, or Government department and among other things Uphold the Constitution, laws and legal regulations of the United States and never be a party to their evasion, Expose corruption wherever discovered and Uphold these principles ever conscious that public office is a public trust precisely because, appointed on November 5, 1979 to work for the U.S. Navy as a civil engineer, I was unlawfully terminated on May 30, 1980 in less than 7 months;[2] based on an otherwise unlawful pretext – yet in reality for 7 weeks of insubordination[3] - since an official U.S. Naval regulation prohibited doing so less than 9 months; on probation yet for “poor performance” only![4] Conclusively since never lawfully terminated as indicated above consequently I’m still a federal civil service employee! Although not paid a salary since May 30, 1980 and working since then as a legal researcher and pro se litigator to secure religious freedom for all those who were or are similarly situated nevertheless I’m still entitled to at least back pay with compounded interest for over 37 years now if not entitled to much more because the subjective reason for my termination; objectively precipitated from 7 weeks of insubordination;

was in reality the religious discrimination that began on November 7, 1979, the third day of my employment during orientation even before my very first job order was assigned to me at which time I had requested, but nevertheless the U.S. Navy had refused to take any initial steps towards achieving for me, a religious accommodation[5] based on two (2) necessary and sufficient religious grounds in order to adjust the Federal Employees’ Health Insurance [“FEHI”] plan that I was offered, like all new incoming federal civil service employees, by excluding coverage only for abortion, contraception and sterilization because not only was it religiously and conscientiously offensive but it was also mandatory as well since in case I refused to: #1, pay that portion of my Employee’s Share of FEHI plan premiums which is used to pay for this religiously offensive coverage in question and/or, #2, thereby consent to an always available temptation to violate my Holy Roman Catholic Religion in practice by violating Mark 14:38 and/or Matthew 26:41[6] for doing so - even arguendo without condition #1 above as otherwise required – consequently I’d be punished for not doing so by the harsh denial to join any FEHI plan offered altogether since included in all was this religiously offensive coverage which in turn is why in 1985 I litigated pro se Rosano  v. United States in part in order to become a class representative[7] for all those similarly situated Prolife “federal” employees. Yet today with Obamacare since the federal government sponsors group health insurance [“GHI”] plans even for “non-federal” employees therefore all those similarly situated Prolifers are in my pro se class action lawsuit[8] as well which demands - as an antidote for its refusal to accommodate to my Roman Catholic practices since November 7, 1979 - that the U.S. Government refund accordingly that portion of all Prolifers’ federally sponsored GHI premiums that went to pay for this religiously offensive coverage on their behalf with compounded interest to boot based on the definition of a burden on the free exercise of religion[9] copyrighted in 2004 which although based on Sherbert v. Verner by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1963 nevertheless does not follow instead the narrower fallacy found therein which as a “federal civil service employee” I did fully Expose corruption wherever discovered as included in my blog at hss-mandate-is-unconstitutional.blogspot.com that all courts including the U.S. Supreme Court as well erroneously followed between 1963 and 1990; when it overturned Sherbert in its Smith decision; when it criminally, because it judicially, treated religious freedom as if it’s a privilege instead of a right yet which still remains hidden today since established into law again but now by Congress in 1993 revised in 1997 known as the Restoration of Freedom of Religion Act [“RFRA”] which my definition will overturn! But I need to appeal;[10] to litigate[11] my reasonable certainty that all anti-life GHI plans will be upheld as unconstitutional which will be a victory for the Holy Roman Catholic Church as well! In addition abortion and contraception will also become unconstitutional[12] because [1] since every FEHI plan offered to me in 1979 was unconstitutional then by reason I was denied a “constitutional” FEHI plan to enroll in and [2] my pro se class action lawsuit i.e. Rosano v. United States [9  Cl.Ct. 137 (1985)] upheld as follows:       (A) “There is no ‘fair interpretation’ that an employee can sue for money, absent a denial of enrollment [emphasis, added] or benefits under a plan, merely, because he objects to the plans in the program.” Id. p 144. (B) “Once jurisdiction was obtained, the court could also consider the constitutional claims.” Id. p 143. (C) “He (Plaintiff-ROSANO) also asks the court for declaratory relief, including ... that abortion is murder ... contraception is constructive murder … [and] homosexuality [Cf. same sex marriage, added] is unconstitutional, etc.” Id. p 141. In 2015 as both a “federal civil service employee” and defendant I had raised justification defenses[13] in a state criminal court in order to do now on appeal what I would have otherwise needed to do in a federal court for it to uphold that: (1) my definition of a burden on the free exercise of religion ©2004 is constitutional (2) “abortion is murder”, and (3) “contraception is constructive murder”, Id. p 141. But even if the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide it all instead nevertheless the burden of proof is still to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt[14] e.g. whether unborn persons exist before abortion and contraception begin Cf. Roe v. Wade[15] which means that both decisions, (2) and (3), above will be upheld as a matter of law, yet only if simultaneously (1) my definition thereof is upheld as constitutional as well thereby proving that all the lawyers who work for the RCC are just dead WRONG ON ABORTION! But listen, here’s how I got into criminal court in the first place! On March 9^th 2015 Police arrested me for “driving” without a New York State-driver’s license, -car registration, -inspection sticker and -auto insurance! At trial on June 15, 16, July 1 & 2 in order to legitimize my alleged criminal conduct above I argued justification defenses as a “federal civil service employee” pursuing the code of ethics for government service as reflected in the endnotes herein by exposing corruption in, thereby proving as a matter of law that, all governmental employees’ anti-life GHI plans violate free exercise of religion clause rights under the federal first amendment according to my definition thereof in a catch 22 which thereby verified that all state criminal courts lack jurisdiction[16] to convict. Turning from my employee’s point of view now Prolifers can efficiently oppose anti-life GHI plans on their own by merely becoming “applicants for federal employment” instead of doing what I did but nevertheless keep the same effect! Once accepted as an applicant for employment, then the Prolifer must request an abortion/contraception/sterilization free GHI plan which option did not exist before I copyrighted my definition in 2004, but now as a matter of law that option is the only one that’s constitutional!

 

Exhibits: Thomas v. Review Board, 101 S.Ct. at 1431           Lawrence R. Rosano K of C #2228

                Double Negatives’ Rule explanation                                  LRR1662@yahoo.com

---

[1] THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE [also known as “CEFGS”, added]

Any Person In Government Service Should: Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party, or Government department.

Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United States and all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion. …

Expose corruption wherever discovered.

Uphold these principles, ever conscious that public office is a public trust.

The Code of Ethics For Government Service was House Concurrent Resolution 175 in the 2^nd Session of the 85^th Congress in 1958. The Code of Ethics For Government Service applies to all Government Employees and Office Holders. See its further explanation in the Congressional Record – House, July 17, 1958, pages 14172-14174.

[2] See Rosano v. Dept. of the Navy, 699 F.2d 1315, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1983) [“Petitioner [ROSANO] was terminated after less than 7 months of service (during probation) for performance-based reasons.”]; Rosano v. U. S., 9 Cl.Ct. 137, 139 (1985) [“During his first days on the job, ... Plaintiff discovered that all the available plans included coverage for abortion and contraception … [and] complained that this choice -- accept a plan that ‘funded’ abortion or be denied health insurance -- violated his first amendment rights”], aff’d 800 F.2d 1226, cert denied 480 U.S. 907. 

[3] On May 3, 1984, in order to explain my insubordination during 7 weeks before, which resulted in termination on, May 30, 1980, thus in Rosano v. Secretary of the Navy, referred to in Rosano v. United States, supra at 140-41, the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, Judges Wallace, Schroeder and Nelson, issued their decision which was filed in a 2-page memorandum not reported but as Memorandum, Index No. 83-6384, D.C. #CV-82-0987-JLI here, below:

“Lawrence Rosano appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy and against his claim that his termination as a probationary employee was due to religious discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1981). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was a member of a legally protected group; (2) he was subjected to adverse treatment; (3) his job performance was satisfactory [emphasis, added]; and (4) he was terminated under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 (9^th Cir. 1981); see also Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Rosano concedes that after April 7, 1980, he devoted his work time almost exclusively to his abortion concerns [emphasis, added] [which is tantamount to insubordination, added]. He also does not deny that he spent more than the estimated time on his assigned projects and that his superiors warned him about his lack of output [But see The Brady Report, in rebuttal thereto, below, added]. Thus, no issue of material fact exists concerning Rosano’s lack of satisfactory job performance prior to termination. Even if Rosano had established a prima facie case, however, an employer’s obligation is to make reasonable accommodations for an employee’s religious beliefs. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S., 74-75 (1977). No case has held that reasonable accommodation means that the employer must pay the employee full salary when the employee spends the majority of his time on matters other than his work assignments. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S., at 84 (requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs is an undue hardship). Under these circumstances, summary judgment in favor of the Secretary was proper.  Affirmed.”

      THE BRADY REPORT

“In response to Exhibit 17, Mr. David C. Edwards, Civil Branch Engineer testified that no records of project job order assignments by job order number were kept by Public Works management on Mr. Rosano’s co-workers to show their elapsed time on a project in relation to the estimated man-days for completion. The complainant’s assertion in his affidavit (Exhibit 7) that the estimated man days cited in the notice of termination as not having been met by the complainant (Exhibit 1) were just estimates not really intended to be met was not successfully rebutted by management’s response (Exhibit 17 and 18).’ – by Richard V. Brady, San Diego, California Equal Opportunity Office [“EEO”] Investigator.”

In order to practice religious discrimination against the entire Prolife Movement, the American Public and me, precisely by not using the “proper” prima facie criteria, in turn, the Ninth Circuit applied the erroneous disparate treatment theory instead of the proper failure to accommodate theory, the distinctions between both of which are explained in Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp, 67 F.Supp. 2d 1359, 1362 (S.D.Fla. 1999) as the Court declared as follows:

“Employees may utilize two theories in asserting religious discrimination claims: disparate treatment and failure to accommodate. (citations omitted) The desparate treatment theory mirrors the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1017-18. In a religious accommodation case, an employee can establish a claim even though he cannot show that other employees were treated more favorably or cannot rebut an employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. At 1018. ‘This is because an employer must, to an extent, actively attempt to accommodate an employee’s religious expression or conduct even if, absent the religious motivation, the employee’s conduct would supply a legitimate ground for discharge [emphasis, added].’ Id. The Plaintiff, who is proceeding under the accommodation theory, correctly argues that the defendant’s articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring the Plaintiff – his refusal to sell birth control – does not end the Court’s analysis. Rather, whether or not Eckerd’s decision not to hire the Plaintiff was supported by legitimate concerns for its business goes to the issue of undue hardship [emphasis, added]. (citations omitted).

A.         The Prima Facie Case

                          In order to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under the ‘failure to accommodate “theory”, the plaintiff must prove: 1) that the Plaintiff had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; 2) that he informed his employer about the conflict (on November 7, 1979, added); and 3) that he was discharged (on May 30, 1980, added) or not hired for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement’ [emphasis, added](citations, omitted).”

Consequently had the Ninth Circuit used the proper failure to accommodate prima facie criteria, I’d have received a favorable decision thereby providing Prolifers with a GHI choice abortion/contraception/sterilization-free that they still don’t have in 2017 thus proving the Ninth Circuit was clearly erroneous by religious discrimination.  On May 23^rd 1980 the U.S. Navy did not, but was required to, notify me that I could appeal my termination during probation to the Merit Systems Protection Board [“MSPB”] due to religious discrimination based, in part or in whole, on conditions arising prior to my appointment on November 5, 1979 which did apply to the FEHI program. Cf. 5 CFR 315.805, -315.806(d). Also I could have based it on the US Navy’s failure to follow its own procedures, 5 C.F.R. 315.806(c) Id. yet I was told no procedures exist; Cf. endnote #4. On Dec. 12, 1980 the MSPB held it had no jurisdiction over religious discrimination for post-appointment reasons. So, to appeal I must sue the MSPB! But now in criminal court I’m uniquely bypassing MSPB procedures to attach criminal charges under 18 U.S.C 242 as well!

[4] “8-3. EVALUATION OF PROBATIONER BY SUPERVISOR.

 a. (5) The Supervisor of each employee serving a probationary period must, no earlier than the beginning of the 9^th month[emphasis, added] nor later than the end of the 10^th month of the period, submit through supervisory channels a signed statement certifying either that the employee’s performance, conduct, and general traits of character have been found satisfactory or that they have been found unsatisfactory. …” – as recited from the Federal Personnel Manual, Subchapter 8, Probation, Chapter 315. Career-Conditional Employment 8-3, issued on February 29, 1980.

[5]  “(29 CFR 1605.2[c]) Reasonable Accommodation. 

(1) After an employee or prospective employee notifies the employer … of his or her need for a religious accommodation, the employer … has an obligation to reasonably accommodate the individual’s religious practice. A refusal to accommodate is justified only when an employer … can demonstrate that an undue hardship would in fact result from each available alternative method of accommodation. A mere assumption that many more people, with the same religious practices as the person being accommodated, may also need accommodation is not evidence of undue hardship [emphasis, added].” See OPM letter below:

Nevertheless in 1979 the Office of Personnel Management [“OPM”] had been violating the above statute, namely 29 C.F.R. 1605.2[c], as revealed in the letter I received only two (2) weeks after I was unlawfully terminated from Camp Pendleton, California, on May 30, 1980 as stated above. In addition this letter also reveals that the OPM committed a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. 242 as well! Consequently by raising New York State Penal Law 35.05 Subd. #1 and/or #2 the imminent danger that I sought to overcome by litigating Rosano v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 137 (1985) was/is this continuous criminal conspiracy that has been deceiving the American People as to what their Federal Constitutional First Amendment Rights were and are under the establishment and/or free exercise of religion clauses under 18 U.S.C. 242. That OPM letter referred to above is dated June 12, 1980 which was sent on my behalf in response to my March 24, 1980 MSPB letter of complaints to my then-California Senator Hayakawa, as follows:

 

“Dear Senator Hayakawa:

 

This is in reply to your letter in the interest of Mr. Lawrence R. Rosano of Oceanside, California concerning coverage for abortions under the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program.

It is our aim to provide for Federal employees, annuitants, and their covered dependants, the broadest coverage at the best premium possible.

Some FEHB plans have always covered therapeutic abortions. Most of our plans now cover all abortions because of the trend to liberalizing state abortion laws. There is no religious discrimination because the Program offers all eligible employees access to the same types of benefits, including comprehensive surgical/medical benefits for pregnancy-related conditions under one or more plans, and the employer contribution is determined on the same basis for all employees. One of the features of group insurance is that a person who enrolls in a plan pays premiums to support all the benefits of that plan – including benefits that the person knows he or she will not use and benefits to which the person may object for personal reasons [emphasis, added] (yet ‘personal’ here is a misnomer for ‘religious’, added).

Some employees and annuitants are concerned about population growth and object to maternity benefits; some who do not drink or use drugs object to benefits for treatments of alcoholism and drug abuse, and others who are mentally healthy object to benefits for treatment of mental illness.

If we were to eliminate all the benefits to which someone objects, and if plans could be tailored to needs of particular groups of people as indicated above, there would be no logical place to stop. The end result would be a simple health benefits program providing only limited hospital and surgical benefits. We feel that this would not be the kind of comprehensive health benefits coverage Congress intended [Cf. Yet to the contrary in 1980 Congress enacted the Hyde Amendment*** banning federal abortion funding for poor women, added] and would not be the kind of coverage most employees want.

Further, it is the opinion of the Office of Personnel Management’s General Counsel that none of the funds which are transferred to OPM by Federal agencies as contributions for the Federal Employees Health Insurance Benefits Program insurance premium payments would properly be considered as having been used to perform abortions, notwithstanding the fact that various Federal Employees Health Benefits plans do provide coverage for abortions. [Cf. by analogy, Obama’s February 10, 2012 HHS concession, added].

This view is shared by the General Accounting Office which, by letter to the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service dated December 5, 1977, announced that:

‘All reimbursements to employees for hospitalization and other medical expenses are made by the carrier and not by the Federal Government. In other words, the fact that the Federal Government contributes to the cost of the insurance premiums does not mean that Federal appropriations are being used to pay for the medical services covered under the health insurance contract …..’

I hope that this information will be helpful to you in responding to your constituent.

                                                                                      Sincerely yours,

                                                                                      William T. Smith, Chief

                                                                                      Program Services Staff

Office of Pay and Benefits Policy”

Since its only alleged reason above for not accommodating to my religion in practice is prohibited under 29 C.F.R. 1605.2c consequently the OPM never raised an undue hardship! So I was/am entitled to a religious accommodation!

*** [above] Thirdly, conclusively my MSPB appeal can be based on partisan political reasons 5 C.F.R. 315.806(b).

[6] “Don’t enter into temptation. The Spirit is willing but the flesh is weak” is included in Matt 26:41 and Mark 14:38.

[7] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has upheld the following:

“The national public policy reflected both in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in §1981 may  [page 447] not be frustrated by the development of overly technical judicial doctrines of standing or election of remedies.  If the plaintiff is sufficiently aggrieved so that he claims enough injury in fact to present a genuine case or controversy in the Article III sense, then he should have standing to sue in his own right and as a class representative [emphasis, added].”

Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc., et al., 445 F.2d 442, 446-447 (1971)

[8] While legal research may reveal another court to achieve non-monetary relief also, in Quinault Allottee Assoc. v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 134, 453 F.2d 1272, 14 ALR Fed. 751 (Ct.Cl. 1972) [the U.S. Court of  Claims or “Ct.Cl.” decisions are followed by the U.S. Claims Court which changed its name, added] the U.S. Court of Claims held this:

“[p]laintiffs ask us to invoke procedures parallel to those of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. … [*137] … the legal question raised by the petition as to the Government’s liability is common to the entire [**1274] group, the claims and defenses of the named individual plaintiffs are typical of the claims and defenses of the group, and the separate claims of many of the individual allottees are very small in amount [emphasis, added] .... There is no reason why this court cannot use the same device, if it is appropriate. So long as the relief is confined to a money judgment [emphasis, added] (United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3 (1969); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 557 (1962)).”

[9] MY DEFINITION: A BURDEN ON THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION ©2004 Lawrence Rocco Rosano

“A burden on the free exercise of religion under the federal first amendment to the United States Constitution is created when a religious adherent is coerced to consent to a proposed temptation to violate religion in principle, only, in order to receive benefits and/or be eligible for employment, both of which are not offensive to religion, or else, be punished for not doing so by being denied the otherwise available benefits and/or employment in question.  The intensity of this temptation is that much stronger when it is always available, instead of proposed, as above, indicated, and, if always available, consequently, the religious adherent is entitled the more to the religious freedom in question, accordingly. However, in both cases, the religious freedom is limited, only, by the government’s showing that the limitation or restriction on religious freedom is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.

Nevertheless, to the contrary, the government is prohibited from doing so, whenever the proposed temptation to violate religion is in practice, instead of in principle, only, regardless, whatever the intensity is, as above indicated.” This is the definition I referred to as Exhibit A on e.g. p 18 at July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 27.

[10] On the 1^st day of my trial, June 15, 2015, on my pro se cross examination of the Department of Motor Vehicles’ representative called, “THE WITNESS”, below, I was successful in obtaining 2 Judicial Decrees at #1 & #7 by Nassau County District Court Judge Eric Bjorneby that I could rely on in order to support my legal arguments under New York State Penal Law [“PL”] 35.05 Subdivision #1 which indeed legitimized my Federal Constitutional Right to Travel Freely by automobile; if not also under PL 35.05 Subdivision #2 by supporting all elements for raising a justification defense acc. to People v Chachere on p 10 and/or under the 2^nd element “that the action taken by the party [me] is reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances known by the party at the time of his act”; as follows:

 

JUDICIAL DECREE [hereinafter “J.D.”] #1  [June 15^th 2015 Tr. 79:14-80:2  MS. DONNA WEISBARD - CROSS]

 

“THE WITNESS: Correct, the action is taken against the driver [emphasis, added].

MR. ROSANO: That’s allegedly the privilege. Are you saying that a person - - you would suspend somebody’s right to travel from one point to another point? [emphasis, added]

THE COURT: To drive, to drive an automobile from one point to another.

MR. ROSANO: I’m saying to transport someone, travel from one point to another.

THE COURT: By automobile, They can’t stop [Tr. 80] you from traveling by airplane, by walking, by bicycle, trolley car, but they control the privilege to drive an automobile and they can suspend or revoke your privilege to drive [emphasis, added].” Cf. J.D. #7 on p 9.

 

Below Judge Bjorneby directly implied all his J.D.s reflect the current definition of “driver” as follows:

 

J.D. #2 [June 16^th, 2015 Tr.10:12-16 POLICE OFFICER [hereinafter known as “P.O.”] RUSSELL - CROSS]

 

“MR. ROSANO: But, your Honor, isn’t a driver ‘a person actually doing driving whether employed by owner to drive or driving his own vehicle’?

THE COURT: Yes, that’s Black’s Law Dictionary [5^th ed. 1979, added].”

 

J.D. #3 [June 16, 2015 Tr. 10:17-25 P.O. RUSSELL - CROSS]

 

“MR. ROSANO: What gives you evidence that I was employed by someone? There was absolutely no one in the car that I was driving, so what gives you evidence that I was employed driving?    

THE COURT: He never said you were employed. No one has ever said you were driving an employee. If you were, you could say that, but no one here has accused you or said that you were an employee of someone when you were driving.”

 

J.D. #4 [June 16^th 2015  Tr.11:19-22 P.O. RUSSELL - CROSS]

 

“MR. ROSANO: According to Black’s dictionary - - [Cf. J.D. #2, added]

THE COURT: Black’s Dictionary is a legal dictionary. It’s not the law of the State of New York.” Cf. But see Hedgeman’s rule of law and my analogy thereto both on p 8.

 

J.D. #5 [June 16^th, 2015  Tr.16:6-15 P.O. RUSSELL - CROSS]

 

“MR. ROSANO: 12:30 a.m., that’s what I thought, but you don’t have evidence that I was driving?

THE COURT: Sir, he testified he observed you driving the car. ...

MR. ROSANO: Well, isn’t driving when you’re employed?

THE COURT: No, has nothing to do with it. If I get in my car to go home today, I’m driving. If you get in your car today and go over to the mall to buy a shirt, you’re driving, you’re operating a motor vehicle, you’re driving.” Cf. contrary to J.D.s #1-#4

 

J.D. #6 [July 1, 2015 Tr. 20:20 – 21:6 P.O. GREENSEICH - CROSS] Cf. see J.D.s #1-#4

 

“MR. ROSANO: What gives you evidence that I was driving at that time?

P.O. GREENSEICH: I observed you driving the car.

MR. ROSANO: Well, what gives you evidence that I was employed at that time?

MS. BONOMO: Your Honor, objection. [July 1, 2015 Tr. 21]

THE COURT: Objection sustained. …

*THE COURT: Sir, you are quoting a Black’s Law Dictionary definition that’s probably a couple hundred years old. It is not the New York State [“NYS”] definition of driving.”

 

JUDGE BJORNEBY’S JUDICIAL DECREE* AT J.D. #6 IS HIS OWN REFUTATION. HERE’S WHY:       

 

On June 16^th Judge Bjorneby concluded that even though my definition of “driver” was the same as that given in Black’s Law Dictionary at J.D. #2 nevertheless since “Black’s Dictionary is a legal dictionary. It’s not the law of the State of New York” at J.D. #4. But to the contrary 2 weeks later on July 1^st Judge Bjorneby changed his reason for saying so by alleging that my definition of “driver” is “probably a couple hundred years old” at J.D. #6 which is a fallacy since I had quoted it from Black’s Law Dictionary’s 1979 edition at J.D. #2. In turn, then pursuant to the double negatives’ rule; which rule is here explained in detail on a page attached to the end of this letter to the editor;  J.D. #6 reveals “It is … the New York State definition of driving” Id. as well! In turn in my July 15, 2016 MOTION TO ACQUIT in Nassau County District Court [“NCDC”] Criminal Part 6 Hon. Judge David Goodsell, I also relied on People v. Hedgeman, 70 N.Y.2d 533, 538-539 (1987) at I on page 8 as follows: “Turning first to the statute’s plain meaning, we conclude… Giving the term its natural and obvious meaning… (Black’s Law Dictionary 33 [5^th ed. 1979]).” In sum the Court and the Assistant District Attorney [“ADA”] failed to dispute and thereby conceded J.D.s #1-#4, #6-#9, #11-#13 and my 3 necessary/sufficient legal arguments at I, II and III based “in law” on page 8 all of which prove that I was/am a traveler, not a driver, now entitled to 3 acquittals! Continue as follows:

 

 “MR. ROSANO: But it was in my state of mind at that time … Raising a justification defense …, …, it was the facts and circumstances within my knowledge at the time [mirroring the 2^nd element acc. to Chachere here on p 10, added], subjectively what I knew as a paralegal since 1983 graduating Adelphi University, and I was acquainted with looking at the Black’s Law Dictionary [5^th edition 1979, added].

THE COURT: Sir, let me stop you for a second. Under the law of the State of New York, employment has nothing to do with the definition of driving a motor vehicle [tantamount to J.D. #5, added].

MR. ROSANO: How is that possible?  [July 1, 2015 Tr. 22] [Cf. page 11:8-15]

THE COURT: Sir, it is, I’m telling you, that’s the law in New York [emphasis, added]. [But to the contrary see; since NYS’s Court of Appeals upheld, “Appellant’s [Judge Bjorneby’s, added] bald [emphasis, added] assertions to the contrary … must be rejected as insufficient to rebut the presumption” People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 294, rendered beforehand at; J.D.s #1-#4, #6, added].

MR. ROSANO: Mr. Bjorneby.

COURT OFFICER: Judge.

THE COURT: I am the judge, you address me as your Honor.

MR. ROSANO: Mr. Bjorneby.

THE COURT: Sir, I’m not going to say it again, you either call me judge or you call me your Honor. You don’t call me mister.

MR. ROSANO: In the plain language of definitions, I was understood that as the definition. In fact, on 16^th of June after trial or whatever, you told me to look at V.T.L. 113.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ROSANO: Okay. Now that was not in my conscience - - in my knowledge at that time. But I went to the law library, and I have it here [emphasis, added]. It says, driver, quote, whenever the term, quote, chauffeur, unquote, or operator - - quote  operator, unquote, or quote, chauffeur’s license , unquote, or, quote, operator’s license, unquote, are used in this chapter,…”

ROSANO’s REBUTTAL: Yet even assuming arguendo I did know VTL §113 nevertheless the reason why I left out the 1^st of the 2 sentences in VTL §113 in the portion of my trial that I just mentioned above is threefold as follows:

I.                    First, on July 15, 2016 I filed my MOTION TO ACQUIT when/where on pp 3 & 4 I had applied People v. Hedgeman, 70 N.Y.2d 533, 538-539, 517 N.E.2d 858, 860-861 (1987) to this VTL §113 controversy however the ADA and/or the Court failed to dispute and thereby conceded completely the legal argument I made as follows:

1.       “Turning first to the statute’s plain meaning [emphasis, added], we conclude that the term ‘actually present’ does not encompass the presence of the getaway driver here. Giving the term its natural and obvious meaning (emphasis, added) (see, McKinney’s Statutes §94), ‘actual’ refers to that which is ‘[opposed] to potential, possible, virtual, theoretical, hypothetical, or nominal * * * * in opposition to constructive or speculative * * * in contradistinction to  virtual or constrictive’ (Black’s [**861] Law Dictionary 33 [5^th ed 1979]  (emphasis, added) …)” Id., supra, 517 N.E.2d 858, 860-861. This is the accepted NYS’s canon of construction in question.

2.       “To hold that the term ‘[DRIVER]’ means presence in the broader sense so as to include ‘[TRAVLER]’, as the

People urge, would read the word ‘[DRIVER]’ out of the statute. It would denude the phrase of its plain meaning [emphasis, added] and, moreover, violate the accepted canon of construction, especially critical when interpreting penal provisions, that words which define or delimit the reach of statutory provisions [as indeed the term, ‘driver’, does, added] may not be disregarded as superfluous, but must be given meaning and effect (see, McKinney’s Statutes §§231, 271 [b].” Id., 517 N.E.2d 858, 861. My analogy to NYS’s canon of construction.

II.                  Secondly, at trial on June 15 and 16, 2015 NCDC Judge Bjorneby was unwilling to accept abortion and/or contraception as an “emergency” under PL 35.05(2) precisely because “not immediate”. However to the contrary on June 25^th 2015 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld as constitutional, so consequently on July 31^st 2015 i.e. before Judge Bjorneby’s final decision on August 4, 2015 which convicted me, I filed my motion to raise justification defenses as a matter of law [“MJD”] in order to overcome, same sex marriage because in 1985 I had included in Rosano v. United States, supra, at p 141, “homosexuality”, similarly situated with abortion and contraception as well. On July 30^th 2016 before NCDC Judge Goodsell my Reply to the ADA’s Opposition argued that the ADA failed to dispute and thereby conceded all I had raised in my above July 31^st 2015 MJD e.g. what was included in my REPLY as this:

 “On June 15^th 2015 before I [ROSANO] left for the day he [Nassau County District Court Judge Eric Bjorneby, added] asked me to look up VTL §113 here at Exhibit A1 for the proper definition of ‘driver’ which reads as follows: ‘Every person who operates or drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Whenever the terms ‘chauffeur’ or ‘operator’ or ‘chauffeur’s license’ or ‘operator’s license’ are used in this subchapter, such terms shall be deemed to mean driver and driver’s license respectively.’ As a general rule of the English language a definition of a word cannot include the identical word in its definition which thereby renders it a nullity. Consequently the phrase in the alleged definition of ‘driver’ above namely, ‘Every person who operates or drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle’ is a nullity. Thus NYS VTL §113 is identical to the definition I understood it to mean in Black’s Law Dictionary,” on p 4 in my July 31^st MJD. Since all MJDs and my justification defenses were decided at trial as indicated in Judge Bjorneby’s final decision consequently same sex marriage is unconstitutional as well!   

III.               Thirdly, my Federal Constitutional argument - as I had asserted on page 6 in my MOTION TO RAISE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AS A MATTER OF LAW SUPPLEMENTAL filed in Criminal Part 6, NCDC Judge Goodsell, on July 23, 2016 - the ADA did not dispute and thereby conceded the following: 

      “Firstly, under the Federal Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Defendant’s [my] federal constitutional right to travel freely by automobile supersedes the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles’ [‘DMV’s’] right to control Defendant’s federal constitutional right to travel freely by automobile by re-naming it a ‘privilege’ instead [e.g. see J.D.s #1; #7 & #9 on p 9, added]!  Secondly, by definition, a right to do so supersedes any privilege to do so. Yet Judge Bjorneby wants Defendant to believe the contrary, namely, that Defendant’s right to travel freely by automobile can be controlled by DMV’s right to control it by re-naming it a privilege, instead.”  

Pursuant to all 3 necessary and sufficient legal arguments above which were conceded ab silencio as my justification defenses by my following CEFGS at PL 35.05(1) at endnote #13 consequently the presumption of regularity that a traveler is also a driver at J.D. #5 collapses and in turn I’m now entitled to 3 acquittals based “in law” as follows:

“A presumption of regularity [here at J.D. #5, added] exists only until contrary substantial evidence appears (citations omitted; 9 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.], §2491). It forces the opposing party (defendant here) to go forward with proof but, once he does go forward, the presumption is out of the case.  It could not conceivably be used to prevent defendant from proving his allegations (e.g. that ROSANO as a traveler acc. to J.D. #9 here was not a driver thereby subject to the NYS VTL Code e.g. NYS VTL §113, added).”

People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 298, 97 N.E.2d 908, 912 (1951)

“Rather, if the People fail to disprove justification, the use of force is deemed lawful (Penal Law § 35.15) and the defendant is entitled to an acquittal [emphasis, added].” People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541, 549 (1986).

THE ADA AND THE COURT FAILED TO DISPUTE AND THEREBY CONCEDED THAT I’M A TRAVELER NOT A DRIVER KNOWN BY ME AS A LITIGATOR - since [1] “Normally what is not disputed is deemed to be conceded,” People v. Gruden, 42 N.Y.2d 214, 216 (1977) [2] “[t]o perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice’” In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) and [3] my religious practice of “Faith without works is dead” James 2:26 following CEFGS is Federal 1^st Amendment protected since pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1605.1 [“define religious practices to include moral or ethical [emphasis, added] [CEFGS, added] beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views”] – as follows:

 

J.D. #7 [June 15^th 2015 Tr. page 90:3–13 MS. DONNA WEISBARD - CROSS] Cf. J.D. #1 on p 6.

 

“MR. ROSANO: So, in other words, a person could have a revoked license and a suspended licenses [which wording DMV always uses, but not ‘privilege’, in its Notices, added] at the same time?

THE WITNESS: Correct.

                THE COURT: Suspended privilege.

THE WITNESS: Suspended privilege, revoked privilege [emphasis, added].

MR. ROSANO: Alleged privilege because it is a constitutional right to travel freely [emphasis and note, consistent thereto at Tr. 79:14 - 80:2, Judge Bjorneby upheld J.D. #1 on page 6, added].

                You’re absolutely certain there are two revocations? That’s all I want to ask her?

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. ROSANO: That’s it.

THE COURT: Okay, any redirect?”

 

J.D. #8 [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 12:1-14  MR. ROSANO - DIRECT] Cf. J.D.s #1-#4, #6 & #7

 

“MR. ROSANO: petitioner - - my motion to raise justification as a matter of law on 12^th of June on Exhibit B as a book I wrote [emphasis, added]. Okay. I copyright in 2004, and this - - I was litigating this case [emphasis, added].

THE COURT: You were driving a car. Were you going to the courthouse?

MR. ROSANO: I was traveling.

THE COURT: I’m sorry?

MR. ROSANO: I was traveling [emphasis, added] on February 3, 2014.

THE COURT: I’m talking about the three dates on which you were charged with driving with a suspended license [i.e. “license” vs. “privilege” Cf. J.D.s #7 & #9, added] on those three days, what were you doing that was required by an emergency situation?”

 

J.D. #9 [July 2^nd  2015 Tr. 12:24 to 13:18  MR. ROSANO - DIRECT] Cf. J.D.s #1-#4, #6-#8

 

 “THE COURT: What were you doing on those three occasions that was of such an emergency nature that it [July 2^nd Tr. 13] justified your driving, even though your privilege [emphasis, added] to do so was suspended?

MR. ROSANO: I was litigating to  - - overturn my case, Rosano against United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 137 in 1985.

THE COURT: When you say you were litigating, you were in a car, you were operating a motor vehicle? You were in a car?

MR. ROSANO: I was traveling [emphasis, added]. …

THE COURT: Mr. Rosano, listen to me. It has to be an emergency. …  Tell me what was such an emergency that walking, biking, taking a bus, taking a train would not have sufficed? What was it that justified your taking your vehicle on the road when your privilege was suspended?” [In turn since J.D.s #1-#4, #6-#9, #11-#13; and I, II & III on p 8; all legitimized my traveling by automobile or at least make it reasonable to do so under J.D. #10 I had no legitimate duty to travel otherwise, added]

 

J.D. #10 [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 14:1-6 MR. ROSANO - DIRECT] Cf. the last 20 lines on page 10.

 

“MR. ROSANO:  …. First of all, anything I do is reasonable, because there is nobody in the country like me, I’m a one-man show. No one.

THE COURT: That I believe [emphasis, added].”

 

CONCLUSION THAT I, ROSANO, KNEW “IN LAW” I WAS A “TRAVELER” NOT A “DRIVER” 

 

In summary the ADA and Judge Bjorneby did not dispute and thereby conceded that “I was traveling” at J.D.s #2-#4 and #6-#9 above, all of which in turn thereby eliminate any doubts about what Judge Bjorneby meant by his judicial decree at J.D. #1, at least at and after trial about what I understood under PL 35.05 Subdivision #1 “in law” based on Judge Bjorneby’s judicial decree at J.D. #1, namely, that I was a “traveler”, not a “driver”, not that my 3 necessary and sufficient legal arguments at I, II and III on p 8 are not just as, if not stronger, to do so! In turn all these judicial decrees and arguments presented in these endnotes to my CW LTE prove as a matter of law that as a traveler I’m not a driver, thereby subject to the VTL Code! Conclusively, as I was unlawfully arrested on March 9^th 2015, and post-trial on January 13^th and August 23^rd 2016 based on the same charges, I am thereby entitled to 3 acquittals! Back to the last day of my trial on July 2, 2015, I also was successful in supporting the 1^st & 2^nd of  the 4 elements arguing justification defenses under PL 35.05 Subdivision #2, all four [4] elements of which are as follows: 

 

“(i)n … cases on the subject of defense, the recurring word and basis of all actions is reasonableness. It is necessary that [1] there is a reasonable belief that an emergency exists; [2] that the action taken by the party is reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances known by the party at the time of his act (or …  inaction, added), [3] that the harm he seeks to prevent is greater than that which he will commit; and most important [4] there is a reasonable certainty that the condition acted against will be completely stopped or overcome.” Numbering in [ ] was added.

 

People v. Chachere, 428 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (1^st Dist., D. Ct. 1980)    

 

                Moreover in 1986 New York State supplemented its definition of the term “reasonableness” as follows:

 

“THE REASONABLE BELIEF STANDARD

 

In People v Goetz (68 NY2d 96 [1986]), the New York Court of Appeals emphasized that the justification statute requires a determination of reasonableness that is both subjective and objective. The critical focus must be placed on the particular defendant and the circumstances actually confronting him at the time of the incident, and what a reasonable person in those circumstances and having defendant's background and experiences [i.e. as both a legal researcher and pro se litigator since 1983, but better yet, as a ‘federal civil service employee’ as defined above since 1980, added] would conclude [emphasis, added] (see, 1 CJI [NY] PL 35.00, Introductory Comment, at 848-849). [page *855] The same basic standards should apply in cases where defendants assert the justification defense defined by Penal Law 35.05(2).”

               

People v. Gray, 150 Misc.2d 852, 854-*855, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Crim.Ct. NYC  1991)

 

                On July 2, 2015 I succeeded in supporting the 1^st and 2^nd elements to my justification defense as follows:

 

“THE COURT: Mr. Rosano, listen to me. It has to be an emergency. An emergency. Tell me what was such an emergency that walking, biking, taking a bus, taking a train would not have sufficed? What was it that justified your taking your vehicle on the road when your privilege was suspended? [In rebuttal read all arguments included in J.D. #9 on p 9, added]

MR. ROSANO: The imminent danger that has been continuing since 1973, even more. The governmental funding of abortion, contraception and sterilization. And now bring out stem cell research, the governmental funding of abortion, it is a violation of the Federal First Amedment under the establishment and free exercise of religion clauses [emphasis, added], and- - I opened up this [July 2^nd 2015 Tr.14] discussion by telling you that it’s more than reasonable, okay.

First of all, anything I do is reasonable, because there is nobody in the country like me, I’m a one-man show. No one [emphasis, added].  

THE COURT: That I believe. [Cf. fact simile is also at J.D. #10 on p 9, added]

MR. ROSANO: And I will explain to you as soon as you give me the opportunity to show that what I was doing is a - - whatever - -

First of all, the emergency. You realize that an emergency can be imminent rather than- -

THE COURT: Must be imminent, it’s not an emergency if it’s not imminent.

MR. ROSANO: Imminent doesn’t have to be right now, it could be two years, three years down the road. But in my case, it’s been going on for over 40 years. I am the sole person in the United States that’s going to uplift the First Amendment rights of everyone in the country [emphasis, added]. And that’s what I’m going to prove to you very shortly. Okay. So let’s get it straight that anything I do is reasonable Okay. Now if I was driving here, I had to drive home, if I was driving to a copy place - - I wasn’t driving, I was traveling. I don’t drive, because driving I have to be employed. [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 15]

THE COURT: Sir, I want you to stop saying that, that is wrong, it is absolutely not the law. The State of New York you don’t have to be employed, if you’re behind the wheel of a car and you’re making that car go down the road, you are driving [Cf. namely, J.D. #5, added].

MR. ROSANO: Are you giving me legal advice? 

THE COURT: Not advice. I’m telling you that’s the law.

MR. ROSANO: According to what?

THE COURT: According to the Vehicle and Traffic law [here, Judge Bjorneby is referring to VTL §113 as he had conceded at July 1^st Tr. 22 in the last 7 lines on p 7, added].”

 

 SUMMARY: Since he issued 5 prior J.D.s that presumed as a traveler I’m not a driver, in order to rebut, Judge Bjorneby must disprove them with contrary substantial evidence under Richetti on p 8 not with his above bald allegations Id.! On pp 10 & 12 support the 1^st element under Chachere, above, in order to raise justification defenses since Judge Bjorneby did not dispute and thereby conceded the imminent danger I defined as future governmental funding for abortion, contraception and sterilization that I attempted to prevent was an emergency that I sought to overcome, here asserted at p 12:1-9. Supporting the 2^nd element which need only be reasonable is my reliance on J.D.s #1-#4, #6-#13 and my arguments at I, II & III on p 8 which prove as a matter of law that my conduct was legitimized and/or starting below on pp 11-24 supporting PL 35.05(1) at endnote #13 for public servants as follows: 

 

 “THE COURT: Now, please continue. Tell me the emergency that you were dealing with.

MR. ROSANO: Okay. Now it has to be - - I’ll just say a little how it began. Okay. Because it has a - - to give you the context. In November 5, 1979, I became a federal employee in California as a civil engineer. On the third day of my employment, before I was assigned my first job, I was presented with health insurance, which had abortion, contraception and sterilization coverage in it. And to get this policy, I had to accept, one, my paying, that portion of my health insurance premium which goes to pay for abortion [July 2^nd 2015 Tr.16] which made me cooperate in paying for it; and number two, even if I didn’t pay for it, I would have to violate my religion under Mark 14:38 and Matthew 26:41 which says, ‘Jesus said, “don’t enter into temptation. The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.”’ It violated my constitutional rights to practice my religion. [emphasis, added].

Now, so just to make a long story short, I was complaining they made me run around, I was fired, And ever since then, I have been working on this [emphasis, added].  

THE COURT: … Go ahead.

MR. ROSANO: I’m trying to say, since then, 1980 until 2002, June 16^th, Sunday, I was doing legal research. 1983 I went to Adelphi, I mentioned it before.

THE COURT: Sir, you need to get to the point. I’m going to say this to you one last time. What you need to tell me is what you were doing on November 28^th of 2011, February 3^rd of 2014 and Mach 9 of 2015. What were you doing at the very moment you were driving that was of such an emergency nature that this justified [July 2^nd  2015 Tr. 17] operating a motor vehicle, even though your license [Cf. Note, not “privilege” see J.D.s #1, #7 & #9, added] was suspended. I’m not going to say this another time. Tell me what you were doing on each of those occasions that was of an emergency nature.  Please.  

MR. ROSANO: I was making known my definition of a burden on the free exercise of religion [emphasis, added] (here at endnote #9 on pages 5 & 6, added) which I came to the conclusion on 2002, June 16^th. Now, I can explain to you, I can explain to you, exactly the juglavein (phonetic) of my entire argument.

THE COURT: I’m listening.

MR. ROSANO: Okay. Now, it has to do about health insurance in context.

THE COURT: No, sir. No, sir. You’re off the mark [emphasis, added]. This has to do with what you were doing on these three dates that was of an emergency nature.  

MR. ROSANO: Everything I was doing was to make known that the government has spent trillions of dollars after - - since 1973 in - - against the Federal First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the free exercise  - - and I was trying to prevent future money spent unconstitutional - - against the First Amendment [emphasis, added].  And I realize on 2002, June 16^th, what the definition was. And if you find - - if you understood what my definition is, you would understand what the fallacy is in Sherbert v Verner that makes all cases [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 18] after Sherbert v Verner, they denied religious freedom. And under 242 U.S.C. 18, a conspiracy in government to deny Federal Constitutional rights is a federal crime. Is it not true?

THE COURT: The question is what were you doing on these three dates that was of an emergency nature?

MR. ROSANO: I was overcoming crime [emphasis, added].

THE COURT: How?

MR. ROSANO: The crime - -

THE COURT: How? Not what. How [emphasis, added]? …

THE COURT: For instance, on March 9^th when Officer Greenseich pulled you over and summonsed you for driving with a suspended license, what was the emergency on that day that you had to get in that car, even though your license was suspended? What was the emergency that was going on, and what were you doing to address the emergency at that moment?

MR. ROSANO: Well, I had my whole car was my legal - - like my pro se law office. I had all my memos in there. It was right near my house. I was going home. Okay. It’s in Elmont, Meacham Avenue.  So what I was doing, I was going home. But the thing is, I had all my stuff in there, and it’s a process, because I am trying [July 2^nd 2015 Tr.19] to make known my definition of a burden on a free exercise of religion which exposes the Supreme Court of the United States in Sherbert v. Verner and all during the time after denying religious freedom, and that’s a crime under 242, is it not? Under 242 U.S.C. 18 [emphasis, added].

THE COURT: You have it cited in your papers? I’ll look at it. Do you have the section cited in your papers? [This proves J. Bjorneby never read my papers as he alleged, added]

MR. ROSANO: I have a section cited.

THE COURT: I’ll look at it. I will look at it. - - …

MR. ROSANO: I was overcoming crime [emphasis, added] [crime prevention, added].

THE COURT: What I have not heard from you is what the emergency was. What was it that prevented you from taking a bus or a bike or a train or walking? What was the emergency that you [had] to get behind that wheel on that day at that time? [Cf. In rebuttal thereto, to the contrary, J.D.s #1-#4, #6-#13 and my arguments at I, II & III on p 8 (in J.D. #9) legitimize my traveling by automobile, therefore I had no legitimate obligation to travel alternatively, added].

MR. ROSANO: Because I was in the process of overcoming this corrupt - - first of all, the government, there is nobody that has jurisdiction. Why? Because they’re violating - - taxpayers money is spent in violation of the Federal First Amendment of the United States Constitution [emphasis, added] [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 20].

MS. BONOMO: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.” [emphasis, added]

 

MY MOTION TO RAISE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AS A MATTER OF LAW WAS GRANTED ABOVE:

I now need to reveal the following necessary background to understand all my justification defenses raised at my trial in 2015. The first emergency I needed to overcome - that in fact I had notified the court beforehand to obtain was a stay by June 25, 2015 - was included in a written motion to raise justification defenses as a matter of law filed on June 12^th 2015 which I referred to in my transcript to follow after the following facts and circumstances:

On January 21, 1990 my Mother, Mary Rosano, died. Subsequently, the Estate of Mary Rosano [“EMR”] left to Robert, my brother, and I - among other things - her residence at 1662 Lydia Avenue, Elmont, N.Y.  Since then, I lived there with a mutual agreement between my brother and I that in place of rent I’d pay the Nassau County Real Estate taxes, and any utility costs due. On June 16, 2002 I discovered the definition of a burden on the free exercise of religion which I realized then also is necessary and sufficient to make abortion unconstitutional.

On and after February 28, 2003 on campus at Adelphi University I quickly began to write my book titled, “HOW ABORTION WILL BECOME UNCONSTITUTIONAL – The Complete Guide For Prolife Activists” which included my definition thereof also which describes how I’d successfully appeal my unlawful removal from federal employment on May 30, 1980 that in spring 2004 I completed after diligently working on it as time is of the essence. At that time also as a Knight of Columbus [“K of C”] at an emergency K of C Chapter meeting of over 100 K of C’s I met and presented this book I had just completed to my Bishop, William Murphy, and to his then-secretary, now Bishop Robert Brennan, so they could review it as an antidote to overcome the Women’s Wellness Act [“WWA”] enacted by the New York State legislature to coerce the Roman Catholic Church to include and pay for group health insurance coverage that includes intrinsically evil abortifacients, contraception and sterilization. Since my book just completed in time had addressed this issue head on, I was confident that in turn I would be able to assist my Bishop. Yet in spite of numerous calls, Bishop Murphy and his secretary avoided me like a plague! But on Oct 25, ‘04 I met Bishop Murphy at an open Faith on Tap meeting in the Wantagh Inn only to learn that he “caved-in” to the NYS legislature by following the WWA; he justified his doing so by following Romans 13:1-7, but he ignored Acts 5:29!

After many futile attempts, I successfully wrote Bishop Murphy a Nov 2009 letter that his attorney, Tom Renker, responded to, who refused to discuss my book! In Dec. 2009 Bishop Murphy again “caved -in” by telling the U.S. Congress that the Roman Catholic Church was only opposed to “surgical” abortions by ignoring to mention all types of abortions, contraception and sterilization as well thereby becoming a global embarrassment! On August 9, 2011 Cardinal Dolan, the then-President of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops [“USCCB”] refused to respond to my letter to him as well but he promised to forward my letter to the appropriate channels. But no response was ever had.

Frustrated with all the Roman Catholic clerics in the USA then on Dec. 8, 2011 I turned to Pope Benedict XVI who contacted Cardinal Dolan on January 19, 2012 instructing him on how to oppose anti-life GHI plans which he did in time to do so on January 20, 2012 against the HHS mandate. But on Feb. 10, 2012 Cardinal Dolan remained dumb: however he should have opposed, by raising that, the Feb. 10, 2012 concession violates Mark 14:38/Matt 26:41 too!

Now with my back up against the wall esp. after all the time, legal research study effort and attention I spent on this singular issue since 1979 consequently I was determined to petition the government for a redress of grievances as a protected right I have under the federal first amendment to the U.S. Constitution by refusing to pay any more Nassau County [“NC”] Real Estate [“RE”] property taxes for living at 1662 Lydia Avenue, Elmont, N.Y. In turn the NC RE Department charged me 10% each 6 months by creating a tax lien which accrued and by notice advised me that unless I paid the outstanding tax lien by June 25, 2015 my brother and I would lose the entire house outright!

Thus I had no other alternative to make my definition thereof known that proves as a matter of law governmental funding employees’ anti-life GHI plans violates the establishment and free exercise of religion clauses to the federal first amendment under the U.S. Constitution since in a catch 22 because the definition thereof is “clearly erroneous”! As a result of my legal expertise e.g. creating the definition of a burden on the free exercise of religion no less I was and still am aware that no government in the USA, federal, state or local has jurisdiction to tax anyone, no less me!

                Therefore against this above background on July 2^nd 2015 Judge Bjorneby granted my motion to raise justification defenses as a matter of law which arguments I had raised on June 15^th when I asserted the following:

“MR. ROSANO: I gave a motion on the 12^th of June … -- it was a motion to raise justification as a matter of law, on the 25^th of June they’re going to take my home away [i.e. This is a bona fide  personal EMERGENCY, added], and the Estate of Mary Rosano owns it, and if you read - - this was filed –

                THE COURT: What’s going on with your mother, your mother’s home has nothing to do with what we are here about in court today. … ”  [June 15, 2015 Tr. p. 2:14-23]

                “THE COURT: These cases involve driving with a suspended license and various other Vehicle and Traffic Law charges. It has nothing to do with your mother’s home or whether the taxes have been paid or the government’s seeking to foreclose or whatever.

MR. ROSANO:  Did you read my motion, your Honor? (emphasis, added)

THE COURT: You gave me a copy, didn’t you?

MR. ROSANO: I gave a copy … to you and I gave a copy to the prosecutor. Is that true? I have a motion to stay.

THE COURT: All right, well, the motion is stayed. That’s addressed to me. That application is denied. There is no reason to stay these proceedings.

MR. ROSANO: Did you read my order to show cause that I filed in New York State Supreme Court? (emphasis, added)

THE COURT: This is what you’re talking about. Right?

MR. ROSANO: Yes.

THE COURT: I did look at it the other day…” [June 15, 2015 Tr. p. 3:3-22]

                “THE COURT: Explain to me what you mean by a justification defense. What is your justification for driving with a suspended license? 

MR. ROSANO: Judge, did you read my motion? (emphasis, added)

                THE COURT: I did look at it, but I don’t see anything in here that makes any sense to me. I don’t see anything in here that –

MR. ROSANO: Did you see Exhibit -A? Exhibit –B - - Exhibit-C, I put that abortion, how abortion will be unconstitutional.

THE COURT: Sir, abortion has absolutely nothing to do with this case.” [June 15^th Tr. p. 4:11-22]

 “MR. ROSANO:  Yes, it does.

THE COURT: Tell me how.

MR. ROSANO: Obviously, you never read it (emphasis, added).

THE COURT: Sir, I am looking at the burden on the free exercise of religion. There is no way that the State’s law regarding abortion have anything to do with the case that’s pending here today involving your driving with a suspended license.” [June 15, 2015 Tr. p. 5:2-11]

“MR. ROSANO: Initially, I will agree with you, but I’m saying that all - - I’ll make a statement. Would you agree that if the government, the federal, state and local government, all governments who fund group health insurance for abortion, contraception and sterilization coverage, if that is a violation of the free exercise of religion clause under the federal First Amendment under the United States constitution, which it is, under Sherbert-v.-Verner, 1963, would you agree with me that nobody has jurisdiction?

THE COURT:  Jurisdiction over what?

MR. ROSANO: Anything?

THE COURT:  No, I don’t agree with you at all. Not true. [June 15, 2015 Tr. 6]

MR. ROSANO: Based on the federal First Amendment to the United States constitution, it says Congress, and of course under the 14^th Amendment, the states and Nassau County [emphasis, added] and so forth, they are - - Congress shall pass no law respecting the establishment - - an establishment of religion - -

THE COURT:  Yes, Sir, but that has - - (emphasis, added).

MR. ROSANO: - - and the free exercise of religion.

THE COURT:  That has nothing to do with you driving with a suspended license.” [6:11]

“MR. ROSANO: [June 15, 2015 Tr.  8:13] Your Honor, you asked your question. I wanted to ask you a question. … The thing is, you asked me what does my mother’s estate - -

THE COURT: Sir, stick with me, please. I am passed that.

MR. ROSANO: But - -

THE COURT: Sir, I have asked you a question. What is your position with respect to the motion to consolidate the cases for trial?

MR. ROSANO: Well, I guess I would, because if New York State has no jurisdiction, it doesn’t make any difference for consolidation.

THE COURT: The application to consolidate is [Id., Tr. 9] granted. [i.e. J.D. #11, added].

MR. ROSANO: Your Honor. [In the above 5 lines the court conceded it lacks jurisdiction, added].

THE COURT: Yes (emphasis, added).

MR. ROSANO: I gave you a motion on the 12^th and you said that you got it.

THE COURT: I have it right in front of me.

MR. ROSANO: All right, so you have it, the prosecutor has it. ... Now, I did make a mistake. I put the 12^th of June. I should have put the 20^th of June, so could you make that correction? Because I am pro se and I did it wrong.

THE COURT: I am not going to change the date. I will entertain the motion today. I don’t have a problem with that.

People, have you seen the motion?

MS. ZIMMERMAN: Yes, we reviewed the motion, but nothing in there was relevant. [Id., Tr. 10].

THE COURT: Let me go over it. Sir, I have read your motion. There is nothing in here that in any way suggests to me that there is any reason to adjourn this trial, so we are going to proceed with the trial. [Yet I wasn’t asking for an adjournment but instead for a stay to pay a NC RE tax lien, added]

MR. ROSANO: I want to ask a question.

THE COURT: What? (emphasis, added)

MR. ROSANO: I am asking you a question, your Honor, if I may. If the whole country, the President and everybody down, legislature, judicial branch, executive branch is violating – taking taxpayers’ money and paying for - - to violate the federal First Amedment, are you saying to me that if everyone is doing it, in a catch 22, and I’m the only one that knows how it’s unconstitutional under the free exercise of religion, and I note it explicitly in a memo; in A, by definition; B, my book, and my blog in Exhibit-C. Your Honor, are you saying to me it doesn’t make any difference, they still have jurisdiction, or would you say that they have no jurisdiction?

THE COURT:  I don’t know what you mean by ‘they’ [emphasis, added]. The prosecutor, the People of the State of New York, and this court, District Court of Nassau County, have jurisdiction over violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law committed in Nassau County. Those violations include driving with a suspended license. (June 15, 2015 Tr. 11) The DA has jurisdiction to prosecute. I have jurisdiction to entertain the trial [emphasis, added]. (On 2^nd glance the ADA and the Court did not dispute and thereby conceded, People v. Gruden, 42 N.Y.2d 214, 216, that all governments & their officials, above, otherwise lack jurisdiction Cf. J.D. #12, added).

MR. ROSANO: I am saying People -v. --

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, Mr. Rosano. May I ask you a question?

MR. ROSANO:  Yes.

THE COURT: You say that I don’t have jurisdiction over you because the federal government has violated your constitutional rights; is that correct?

MR. ROSANO: No, not exactly.  I‘m saying that you do have jurisdiction, but - - you do have jurisdiction for the justification defense [since the court conceded afterwards that it can decide whether it lacks jurisdiction at J.D. #12, added]. But what I’m saying is that the elements of justification, if I may just put it, you have to have a reasonable belief that an emergency exists. It’s a crime, it’s a federal crime  - - 

THE COURT: What’s a crime?

MR. ROSANO:  Governmental officials deceiving the American people of what the federal First Amendment [emphasis, added] [i.e. a “federal” crime under18 U.S.C. 242, added]- -

THE COURT: Sir, let me stop you for a minute. That has nothing to do – the emergency has to do -- if there were a justification issue, the emergency would have to do with you’re driving while you had a suspended license. For instance, if you were telling me that you (June 15, 2015 Tr. 12) got into your car and you drove because you had a seriously injured person there that you had to get to the hospital [Cf. similarly at July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 21 here on p 17, added] that’s an emergency that may, may excuse you’re driving without the proper license, okay, because you were dealing with the emergency situation, but the emergency has to deal with your actions, not somebody else’s actions…. The emergency has to deal with why you got behind the wheel of a car and drove when your license was suspended [emphasis, added].

MR. ROSANO: Your Honor, I’m pretty knowledgeable about the First Amendment and the elements. The first element only has to have a reasonable belief. You don’t have to - - know, the second element, my actions, driving without a license, with a suspended license, not paying my Nassau County real estate taxes has to be reasonable under the facts and circumstances known to me at the time, and in my expertise, after Bernhard Goetz’ case in 1986, they look at the defendant and his actions. [Addressing the third element under Chachere on p 10 follows, added]

Now, of course now I’m saying that whatever violation I did, whatever, if ever there was, is a lot less than spending more money - - actually, it’s a crime, it’s a crime for over 40 years now.

Now, the fourth element (June 15, 2015 Tr. 13) is … that I can overcome completely the emergency I’m going against, and this element - - Exhibit-A … the definition, B is my book, and C is my blog has … a reasonable certainty that abortion and contraception is unconstitutional.

THE COURT: But that has nothing to do and does not excuse you driving with a suspended license [Cf. this LTE pp 1-2, added] I am not going to discuss this with you anymore.

MR. ROSANO: From one element - -

THE COURT: I heard you. I have read your materials. We are proceeding with the trial.

MR. ROSANO: Your Honor, could I get a decision about disproving beyond a reasonable doubt anything, any of the elements that I raised?

THE COURT: You will get a decision at the end of the trial, not at the beginning of the trial [emphasis, added] [Cf. But in 1988 NCDC Judge Warshawsky approved my doing so pre-trial, added]

MR. ROSANO: No, the justification defense that I raised - - may I read the statute, the end part [i.e. to PL 35.05 Subdivision #2 that places an obligation upon the Court to do so which reads as follows:

‘Whenever (emphasis, added) evidence relating to the defense of justification under this subdivision is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense (emphasis, added)’, added]?

THE COURT: Sir, when you come to your defense, you may, when you come to your defense. The case starts with the People. The People present their evidence first. When the People are finished presenting their evidence, they rest, then it’s your turn.

MR. ROSANO: But as a decision then, you’re (June 15, 2015 Tr. 14) denying my right - - my emergency to have a stay on the 2012 - -

THE COURT: I am denying your application for a stay, yes.

MR. ROSANO: That’s a motion to raise justifications as a matter of law, you’re denying it?

THE COURT: Your motion for a stay I am denying….

THE COURT: Mr. Rosano, stop” [June 15, 2015 Tr. 14:16] [emphasis, added].

“MR. ROSANO:  [June 15, 2015 Tr. 17:2] Your Honor, you said on the 12^th of June that the State Supreme Court has jurisdiction over Nassau County District Court?

THE COURT: What I said was I was not going to grant a stay (emphasis, added). I said, if you want, you could go and ask the Supreme Court and see if they’re willing to grant a stay or not. They were not willing to do so.

MR. ROSANO:  No, no, the stay on the June 25^th deadline.

THE COURT: I don’t know what June 25^th deadline you’re talking about

MR. ROSANO:  Real estate, if I don’t pay - -

THE COURT: That has nothing to do with this case.

MR. ROSANO: It does. [Cf. page 12, line 30, added]

THE COURT: Sir, stop (emphasis, added). … [June 15, 2015 Tr. 18) …

[On second glance since Judge Bjorneby didn’t even know “what June 25^th deadline [I’m] talking about” Id. consequently he never read my June 12^th 2015 MJD which legitimized NCDC to grant a stay to pay my NC RE tax lien so as to provide me e.g. with an unburdened state of mind during my pro se trial in order to litigate and thereby unfold Rosano v. United States which had and still has a reasonable certainty of establishing in law my definition of the burden on the free exercise of religion which proves Nassau County had no jurisdiction to tax on me in the first place, added]

MR. ROSANO:  For the record, you’re denying my stay for the June 25^th deadline?

THE COURT: I am not staying the trial. That’s right. …. We are proceeding.

MR. ROSANO:  No, no, that has nothing to do - - there is a petition for the Nassau County real estate tax lien.

THE COURT: Sir, I have nothing to do with the tax lien.

MR. ROSANO:  Did you read - -

THE COURT: Sir, this Court has nothing to do with your tax lien, period. Don’t raise it anymore. It is not relevant here. You may not raise your tax lien as a defense to driving with a suspended license. [But I was ONLY asking for a stay to pay off the NC RE tax lien instead, added]

MR. ROSANO:  Do I have a right to raise the jurisdiction of the Court?

THE COURT: Yes. You always have the right to raise the jurisdiction of the Court, but my jurisdiction, I don’t see that it’s impacted in any way, and I have looked at your materials. I’ve read you materials. My jurisdiction is not impacted in any way by the status of your real estate.

MR. ROSANO: No, no, I’m saying my (Tr.19) copyrighted definition of a burden on a free exercise of religion in my book.

THE COURT: It has nothing to do with this case. Sir, stop. I don’t want to keep going over old territory (emphasis, added). (June 15, 2015 Tr. 19:5)”

 

On the last day of trial, July 2^nd 2015, at Tr. 6:4-8 I asked the Court here also at J.D. #12 on p 21 as follows: 

 

“MR. ROSANO: ... [do] you have jurisdiction to decide that you have no jurisdiction?

THE COURT: Yes, a Court can decide that it doesn’t have jurisdiction. Marbury versus Madison.”

 

Now I’m entitled to argue overcoming crime (18 U.S.C. 242) by proving the court lacked jurisdiction based on my definition thereof ©2004 which in turn entitles me to 3 acquittals, and I should have been granted a stay of the Nassau County Real Estate Taxes and a stay of the Nassau County Real Estate Tax Lien allegedly owed as well.

In turn my brother and I are entitled to a refund of allegedly lawful Nassau County Real Estate Taxes and the Nassau County Real Estate Tax Lien imposed as well since as indemnification days before June 25, 2015 my brother paid not only the allegedly lawful outstanding tax lien but the allegedly lawful taxes owed as well, about $70,000, in order to stop the unlawful transfer in place of the stay I had requested but failed to receive! Also I’m entitled to the return of my car, impounded on August 23, 2016, without the need to pay for storage and towing fees, traffic tickets and fines allegedly lawfully imposed based on J.D.s #1-#4, #6-#13 and I, II & III on p 8 upholding e.g. my federal constitutional right to travel freely by automobile. My trial on July 2^nd at Tr. 20 on p 12 continues as this:

 

 “MR. ROSANO: And under Flast v Cohen, any taxpayer can protest. In my case, I’m unique. I’m the only one. I copyrighted it in 2004, my definition. And what I can do, I can explain - - in the justification defense I have to have something solid. Not just reasonable, but it has to be, the value has to be - - the value has to be fixed.

THE COURT: Mr. Rosano, I understand your argument [emphasis, added].

MR. ROSANO: I didn’t explain it.

THE COURT: I understand the argument you’ve made. I understand what you’re saying. Is there anything else you want to tell me?

MR. ROSANO: I want to explain what it is [emphasis, added].

THE COURT: What what is?

MR. ROSANO: My definition of a burden on the free exercise of religion.

THE COURT: I don’t need to know that.

MR. ROSANO: In other words, you’re saying to me you’re not going to allow me to raise a justification defense? [subjectively proving NCDC lacks jurisdiction, added]

THE COURT: You have raised a justification defense, but you have not given me any evidence in [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 21] support of it. You have not described to me any emergency that was going on at this moment that required you to disregard the law and get behind the wheel of the car. I have not heard that you had any sick person in the car, that you had to get to the hospital [Cf. June 15, 2015 Tr. 12, here at p 15, added]. 

MR. ROSANO: That’s immediate.

THE COURT: I haven’t heard anything like that.

MR. ROSANO: You said imminent [Cf. July 2^nd Tr. 14 last line on p 10, added]. I asked you before, and didn’t you say that you can have an imminent emergency?

THE COURT: I said that it has to be something imminent.

MR. ROSANO: In my description, this emergency has been going on since 1973. It’s keeps going, it’s a continuous emergency. And nobody has addressed it except me. I’m a one-man show. Anything I do is reasonable.

THE COURT: Sir, you’re one-man show that needs to travel by walking or taking a train or taking a bus or taking a cab. [Cf. Rebuttal arguments at J.D #9 on p 9, added]

MR. ROSANO: Time is of the essence. As we speak, money is being wasted in violation of the First Amendment.

THE COURT: I have your argument. [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 22]

MR. ROSANO: No, that’s one. I said there is two.

THE COURT: Give me the other argument [emphasis, added].

MR. ROSANO:  I haven’t - - first of all, I haven’t explained - - wait, - - I did explain it in the June 12^th motion to raise justification, which you actually granted ab silencio … on the 15th [since “Normally what is not disputed is deemed to be conceded” People v. Gruden, supra, added]  

THE COURT: I’m listening to you now. This is your trial, and I’m listening to you now waiting to hear what your justification defense is. …. [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 23:11]

MR. ROSANO:  Are you telling me that I can’t tell you the subjective [Cf. on p 10 ‘subjective’ allowed under People v Gray, added] reasons why I did what I did [emphasis, added]?

THE COURT: I think that you already have.

MR. ROSANO: No.

THE COURT: Then do it now. Tell me now your objective reasons.

MR. ROSANO: Subjective.

THE COURT: Subjective. Tell me now your subjective reason.          

MR. ROSANO: You prohibit me - -

THE COURT: Tell me now.

MR. ROSANO: You’re overruling your prior, because you didn’t want to hear it. All right.

Subjectively, I was an employee in 1979 [emphasis, added] - -

THE COURT: Sir, we’re not going back to that…. [p 24 skip] ..[July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 25:19 starts below]

MR. ROSANO: Judge, addressing what you’re saying what I was doing, I have to explain to you that I am right now a constructive federal employee [emphasis, added] The reason why I was terminated in 1980, May 30^th, in the 7^th month of my probation, but the federal regulations which I have in exhibit in my Order to Show Cause, Exhibit B, page 43, it’ 43 and 44. 43, it says that [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 26] the federal government, which is the navy at the time, I worked for Camp Pendleton in California. It was prohibited - - the navy was prohibited to fire me any time earlier than the 9^th month. So they did not follow procedures [Cf. as articulated here in both endnotes #2 & #4, added].

THE COURT: Sir, that’s ancient history as far as this case is concerned.

MR. ROSANO: No, I’m going to get to that very soon. The thing is that they - - I am still - - the navy terminated me unlawfully, that means I’m still an employee! When I’m raising a justification defense, I’m not only raising it under subsection 35.05(2), I’m raising it under 35.05(1) [defined in endnote #13 needs no emergency to raise justification defenses by following CEFGS, added], and it says if you’re doing your work as a federal employee - - well, an official.       

THE COURT: What were you doing that was required by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of official powers or duties [emphasis, added]?

MR. ROSANO: On March 12, 1980 while I was employed, I was given a newsletter.

THE COURT: No, sir, on the dates of these three tickets.

MR. ROSANO: I was pursuing the code of ethics for government service [emphasis, added]. It says it in the newsletter, if I may read it.

THE COURT: Sir, stop. I have your argument. [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 27]    I have your argument [emphasis, added].

MR. ROSANO: It’s in page - - in my Order to Show Cause, which I gave you June 12^th, it’s my book. It’s an exhibit, A, B and C. B is my book, A is a definition, one-page definition, and C is my blog that would give you a reasonable”. [Exhibits A, B and C, above, support of the 4^th element in my justification defense that as a matter of law only a Court may decide after the 1^st 3 elements are supported, see Chachere on p 10, added].

 

Finally on July 2^nd 2015 at the beginning of trial that day from Tr. 10:13 to 11:24 reveals the following:

 

“THE COURT: Sir, you’re charged with driving with a suspended license on three separate occasions. Let’s get to those three occasions, and tell me what you were doing, and the reason that you were doing it that justified your driving even though your license [Note: not “privilege” as Judge Bjorneby encouraged the WITNESS to say at J.D. #7, added] was suspended.

MR. ROSANO: I was - -

THE COURT: What was the emergency you were dealing with?

MR. ROSANO: I was exercising my Federal First Amedment Right to prove that Sherbert v Verner, 1963, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, they made a decision, and yes - - but they planted a fallacy,  [July 2^nd 2015 Tr. 11] and that fallacy denied Federal First Amendment Rights under the free exercise of religion after that. And in 1987, I raised this in my petition [for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court see Rosano v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 137 (1985), aff’d 800 F.2d 1226, cert denied 480 U.S. 907, added] to make federal employee health insurance, in other words, health insurance funded by the government unconstitutional. And three years later, the Supreme Court overturned Sherbert under the notorious Smith case [decided in 1990, added]. But all it overturned was the fallacy that I’m going to expose. And three years after that, Congress got indignant and legislated what Sherbert had held in a fallacy, it was a fallacy from 1963 to 1990.

And now, to go against the Obamacare, all these groups are using the Religious Freedom Restoration Act [“RFRA” added], which is the legislative act, but that denies religious freedom.  So what I’m saying is that I know exclusively there is no one in the country that knows how to overturn Sherbert v – [know] why Sherbert v Verner in 1963 was clearly erroneous, held to the fallacy [emphasis, added]. And which I can do right now, I will explain to you this, I would say that it’s a pivot point - -- 

THE COURT: Sir, what you need to explain to me is on each of these three occasions, what were you doing that was of an emergency nature that made you have to drive?”

 

LEGAL ANALYSIS I: The U.S. Supreme Court has held, “that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional claims, and therefore a federal court should, … , refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding” Doran v. Salem, Inn., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975). Answering Judge Bjorneby’s question above will now allow evidence to support the 4^th element under PL 35.05 Subd. #2 Cf. endnote [“n.”] #10 p 10 at the top half. The emergency that I sought to overcome by appealing Rosano v. United States - during the time “I was litigating this case” Id. as I mentioned above during my trial - was among other things “RFRA”. The U.S. Supreme Court’s doing so was and still is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. 242 by deceiving the American People, no less Prolifers, in a governmental conspiracy from knowing and understanding what their true free exercise of religion rights are. Now please realize, first of all, that doesn’t mean that Sherbert was wrongly decided on the merits based on the facts and circumstances that the Plaintiff, Mrs. Sherbert, found herself in at the time: In fact to the contrary Sherbert v. Verner was correctly decided, even based on my 2004 copyrighted definition of a burden on the free exercise of religion!

Then, why did I just mention above that the U.S. Supreme Court “planted a fallacy, [July 2^nd Tr. 11] and that fallacy denied Federal First Amendment Rights under the free exercise of religion after that”? Id. In response the answer is because (2) holdings found in the Sherbert decision violate the doctrine of non-contradiction where one holding is valid and the other is a fallacy. In 1981 the U.S. Supreme Court even followed Sherbert again and thereby duplicated these 2 contradictions in Thomas v. Review Board [450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425] as follows:

A.                  “‘The ruling [disqualifying Mrs. Sherbert from benefits (as an applicant for employment, added) because of her refusal to work on Saturday in violation of her faith] (as an employee, added)’” Id., 101 S.Ct. at p 1431 [2^nd col.], attached, is a violation of the doctrine of non-contradiction because she cannot be both an applicant for employment and an employee at the same time! In analysis this fallacy in law can be revealed in either of the two ways below:

On the one hand from the above “The [ruling” Id. to the contrary had otherwise qualified Mrs. Sherbert for benefits, precisely “because of her refusal” Id.  to do so, her employer fired her without just cause. On the other hand subsequently “‘The ruling [disqualifying Mrs. Sherbert from benefits” Id., yet to the contrary, merely coerced her to consent to a proposed temptation to violate religion in principle only, but never to violate her religion in practice!

B.                  “A similar argument was made and rejected in Sherbert, however. It is true that, as in Sherbert, the Indiana law does not compel a violation of conscience [emphasis, added]. But, ‘this is only the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry.’ 374 U.S., at 403-404. In a variety of ways we have said that ‘[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion [acc. to the compelling state interest test created in Sherbert, yet erroneously applied to a coercion; and a coercion to consent to a temptation; to violate religion in practice acc. to RFRA, added].’” Id. at p 1431 [2^nd col.].

¶A above places a burden on the free exercise of religion upon Mrs. Sherbert defined precisely and accurately as a coercion to violate religion in practice whereas ¶B above, a coercion to consent to a proposed temptation to violate religion in principle only i.e. never in practice. As the U.S. Supreme Court in ¶B correctly noted, “It is true that, as in Sherbert, the Indiana law does not compel a violation of conscience” Id. thereby proving that ¶A above unfolds as a fallacy that’s responsible for the courts, applying RFRA, treating religious freedom as if it’s a privilege! But before leaving these conclusions that I made above I therefore need to assure CW readers that the U.S. Supreme Court did not, as I just proved it had done by including ¶A, deceive again by stating in Thomas, “It is true”! Id. To do this I now make references to my CW LTE titled UNCONSTITUTIONAL PER SE (“UPS”) May 2013 pp 8-10 [paper ed], pp 10-13 [electric ed] turning to page 8 [paper ed] pp 10-11 [electric ed] as follows:

“[t]he only three burdens needed to define the unconstitutionality of the HHS mandate according to the free exercise of religion clause to the federal first amendment are these: A) a coercion to violate religion in practice; B) a coercion to consent to a temptation to violate religion in practice, and C) a coercion to consent to a proposed temptation to violate religion in principle only.”

                The burden described above in ¶A is identical to the burden “A)” above taken from my CW LTE, UPS. The burden described above in ¶B i.e. “A similar argument …” is identical to the burden “C)” above taken from my CW LTE, UPS. Below I reflected all 3 burdens i.e. A, B and C above on p 8 (paper ed.) p 11 (electric ed.) Id. as follows:

 “So no wonder considering Sherbert v. Verner decided in 1963 where Mrs. Sherbert claimed that the State had placed a burden C on the free exercise of her religion the U.S. Supreme Court would have permitted the government to do so yet only on condition that the governmental limitation or restriction in question, here burden C, was shown to be the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest. But in Sherbert the government failed to meet its burden of proof. In turn she didn’t have to lawfully submit herself to burden C. In 1981 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, after which, Sherbert had remained a landmark case regarding the free exercise of religion clause applied to burden C only (yet hidden until now) confirmed as follows: ‘A similar argument was made and rejected in Sherbert, however. It is true that, as in Sherbert, the Indiana law does not compel a violation of conscience [defined above as burden C, added]. But ‘this is only the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry.’ 374 U.S., at 403-404. In a variety of ways we have said that ‘[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it burdens the free exercise of religion [as measured by the above some compelling state interest test established in Sherbert, added].’” Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 717. Yet to the contrary burdens A and B would indeed compel a violation of conscience because both are in practice and thus would religiously discriminate whereas C never would do so. In 1963 the U.S. Supreme Court held with respect to burdens A and/or B above the following: “For ‘[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance [emphasis, added] of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions [emphasis, added] that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect [emphasis, added].’ Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, at 607.”  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, at 404, 83 S.Ct., at 1794. Carefully note that ‘that law is constitutionally invalid’ even though some compelling state interest test wasn’t mentioned and ‘[i]mpede the observance’, Id., is what identical verses at Matt. 26:41 and Mark 14:38 prohibited as ‘Watch and pray that you enter not into temptation. The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak.’ Id. Moreover the U.S. Supreme Court in context defined “an indirect burden on the free exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself”, Id., 606, regarding A and/or B above, Cf. the HHS mandate!”

As a One Man Show under The Code of Ethics my subjective reason for “driving” (i.e. traveling) as needed was to Expose, Id. this federal crime (18 U.S.C. 242) against e.g. The Little Sisters of the Poor who oppose offering anti-life GHI i.e. burdens A and/or B and who are represented by Law Professor Mark L. Rienzi who consistently argues erroneously as if religious freedom is a privilege; e.g. before the U.S. Supreme Court by showing that their  Roman Catholic Religious practices pass the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest test whereas truth be told in reality that test was authorized in 1963 only for those burdened by C, but not by A and/or B!

[11] Note 5 U.S.C. 7702(f) which reads as follows: “(f) In any case in which an employee is required to file any action, appeal, or petition under this section and the employee timely files the action, appeal, or petition with an agency other than the agency with which the action, appeal, or petition is to be filed, the employee shall be treated as having timely filed the action, appeal, or petition as of the date it is filed with the proper agency.” See Whittington v. MSPB, 80 F.3d 471 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Miller v. Department of the Army, 987 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1993) [“Thus, the statute clearly mandates that the Board excuse a failure to file an appeal within the specific period when an appellant timely files it with another agency, irrespective of the cause for the error (emphasis, added).”]. Cf. see n. #12 (B).

[12] Under Burden and degree of proof affirmative defenses 5 C.F.R. 1201.56(b)(3) “[t]he Board [‘MSPB’] is required to overturn [MY REMOVAL] by the [U.S. NAVY] even where the agency has met the evidentiary standard set forth in subsection (a), above, in any case the appellant: (1) Shows harmful error in the application of the agency’s procedures [emphasis,  added] in arriving at such decision [i.e. (A) on/since Nov 7, 1979 at, and in passages attached to, n.’s  #3  & #5; (B) on Jan 7, 1980 a catch 22 to choose either (i) pursue my FEHI complaint at work but be rejected for lack of jurisdiction or else (ii) do so on my own, only after work, by writing letters to the MSPB in Washington, D.C. who has jurisdiction to do so; but using (i) forecloses using (ii) and visa versa, but see n. #11; and (C) on May 30, 1980 at, and in passages attached to, n.’s #2  & #4; all procedures of which the Navy had violated, added] or (3) Shows that the decision was not in accordance with law [i.e. my definition of a burden on the free exercise of religion ©2004 is constitutional, abortion is murder, contraception is constructive murder, etc., added]”!

[13] “Justification. New York State Penal Law 35.05.  Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining justifiable use of physical force, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when: 1) Such conduct is required or authorized by law or by a judicial decree, or is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of his official powers, duties or functions.  2)” see above Chachere on p 10.

[14] Under Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. 411, 418 (1980) because it has exclusive jurisdiction over MSPB appeals by federal employees, the CAFC would otherwise decide Rosano v. MSPB yet the U.S. Attorney would still have the same burden of proof as would have been for the ADA in criminal court i.e. to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt!

[15] “We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins … the judiciary at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer,” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).

[16] All state criminal courts lack jurisdiction because all governmental employees’ anti-life GHI plans violate the Federal 1^st Amendment. At my 2015 trial Judge Bjorneby conceded ab silencio he lacked jurisdiction as follows:

 

J.D. #11 [June 15^th 2015 Tr. 8:19– 9:1] Judge Bjorneby presupposed his Court lacked jurisdiction, here

                                                recited beforehand also on p 14, even before testimony began as follows:                                           

“THE COURT: Sir, I have asked you a question. What is your position with respect to the motion to consolidate the cases for trial?

MR. ROSANO: Well, I guess I would, because if New York State has no jurisdiction, it doesn’t make any difference for consolidation.

THE COURT: The application to consolidate is [June 15^th Tr.  9] granted.”

 

J.D. #12 [July 2^nd 2015 at Tr. 6:4-8] Here I asked a question to Judge Bjorneby who responded, as recited                                                    beforehand also on page 16, as follow:

 

“MR. ROSANO: .. [do] you have jurisdiction to decide that you have no jurisdiction?

THE COURT: Yes, a Court can decide that it doesn’t have jurisdiction. Marbury   versus Madison.”

 

J.D. #13 On July 1^st Judge Bjorneby below again conceded ab silencio that NCDC lacked subject matter jurisdiction                                … and “there is no time limit on such applications,” People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 298 (1951).

 

“Defendant was charged with resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), tried before a jury and convicted on the basis of a misdemeanor information which set forth no factual allegations establishing that the police officer was effecting an authorized arrest [emphasis, added]. The information was insufficient on its face because it lacked the necessary nonhearsay allegations [emphasis, added] which [*135] would establish, ‘if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof’ (CPL 100.40 [1] [c]; 100.15 [3]).  We hold that this omission constituted a jurisdictional defect which was not waived by defendant's [ROSANO’s] failure to raise the issue until after completion of the trial [emphasis, added].” Cf. Id., 298.

 

People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 134-135, 517 N.Y.S.2d 927, 511 N.E.2d 71 (1987)

 

On July 1, 2015 the ADA asked, and P.O. Greenseich testified, at Tr. 12: 10–15 as follows:

 

“Q. And when you first observed the vehicle, what violation did you observe?

A. The uninspected vehicle.

Q. How did you know it was an uninspected vehicle?

A. The inspection sticker was gray in color, which indicated it expired in 2014.” [But  because this statement wasn’t articulated in his supporting deposition, in turn, my car stop was legally unauthorized, added]

 

Also on July 1, 2015 P.O. Greenseich testified at Tr. 45:11-23 as follows:

 

“COURT OFFICER: Defendant’s A.

THE COURT: Do you recognize the document?

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

THE COURT: What is that?

THE WITNESS: It’s a supporting deposition [emphasis, added].

THE COURT: Is that one you prepared for this case?

THE WITNESS: I didn’t prepare it, I signed it [emphasis, added].

THE COURT: You signed it, okay.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: When did you sign it?

THE WITNESS: April 9, 2015.”

 

In addition on July 1, 2015 I asked P.O. Greenseich questions between Tr. 46:1–49:23 as follows:

“Q. Now, you told me prior - - well, what was - - your reasonable suspicion that justified you stopping, coming right around and stopping my car on Meacham Avenue?

A.  Because your inspection sticker was expired.

Q.  So that gave you a reasonable suspicion?

A.  Gave me reason to stop you, yes.

Q.  Looking at that information or the accusatory instrument, is that included in your information?

MS. BONOMO: Objection, your Honor. I don’t believe that’s an accusatory instrument.

THE COURT: It’s a supporting deposition.

THE WITNESS: It’s a supporting deposition.

THE COURT: It’s a supporting deposition.

Q.  Well, did you include it in your supporting deposition or accusatory instrument?

A. Yeah, it’s right here, uninspected motor vehicle.

Q.  I’m saying, did you articulate your reasonable suspicion to stop me?

A. Yeah, it says I did observe.

THE COURT: He observed an expired inspection sticker.

A. It says it right here: To Wit, I did observe the defendant, Lawrence R. Rosano, operating a 2004 Hyundai, New York registration Frank, Zebra, David, 4402 on a public highway violating the below statutes, and it lists the  [July 1, 2015 Tr. 47] statutes.

THE COURT: One of them is listed - -

THE WITNESS: As uninspected motor vehicle.

THE COURT: Uninspected.

Q. That is the charges that you placed or imposed on me. I’m telling you, did you articulate, not in the form, I’m saying in your words, did you articulate what the reasonable suspicion that you had to justify stopping my car?

MS. BONOMO: Objection, your Honor, asked and answered.

THE COURT: Asked and answered.  Sustained. Move on.

Q.  What gave you - -

THE COURT: Move on to something else.

Q.  What gave you - - what authorized your stop?

THE COURT: That’s been asked and answered several times.

MR. ROSANO: He didn’t articulate.

THE COURT: Yes, he did, several times. He said he saw you driving a car stopped at a light and that you had an expired inspection sticker on your window. That’s why he pulled you over. He’s testified to it several times, do not ask him to repeat. Please go on to something else.

MR. ROSANO: He didn’t articulate it in the [July 1, 2015 Tr. 48] information. 

THE COURT: He said he observed an expired inspection.

MR. ROSANO: He didn’t - -

THE COURT: He didn’t use the word sticker, he said he observed an expired inspection.

MR. ROSANO: There is form words, then there is words that he indicates - -

THE COURT: Move on to something else.

 

MR. ROSANO

 

Q.  So it’s safe to say you didn’t articulate the reasonable suspicion?

MS. BONOMO: Objection, your Honor. Asked and answered.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Q. What gave you - -

THE COURT: Sir, move on to something else. I’m not going to tell you again, move on to something else.

MR. ROSANO: Are you saying you’re not going to give me the information back? The accusatory instrument?

THE COURT: If it’s not in evidence, you can get it back.

COURT OFFICER: It’s a supporting deposition, [July 1, 2015 Tr. 49] sir.

THE COURT: Return it to Mr. Rosano.

Any other questions for Officer Greenseich?

MR. ROSANO: I just wanted to see. [Here I looked over the supporting deposition, added]

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ROSANO: You’re saying move on, I didn’t see everything - - it was what I was charged with, it wasn’t showing that the rest of the stop was authorized.

THE COURT: Sir, it says he observed you with an expired inspection, that gives him authorization to stop you.    

MR. ROSANO: Your Honor - - as a matter of fact, when I met him, what he said was that he observed the color of my- - (that’s how he had authorization, added) it is not articulated in this information.

THE COURT: That’s right, he doesn’t describe the color. He simply said it was expired, and he tells you the reason he knows it’s expired is because it’s gray. No, he did not discuss the color of the sticker in his supporting deposition [incriminating himself by his lack of subject matter jurisdiction, added]. 

MR. ROSANO: Therefore, he only put the charges that I was with - - you missed putting in the - - [emphasis, added].

THE COURT: Move on to something else, please.” [Tr. 49:23]

 

MR. ROSANO. [July 1, 2015 Tr. 50:19 – 51:11]

 

“Q. - - I just showed you the accusatory instrument [i.e. the supporting deposition, added]. There is no mention of you articulating about - - the color of the inspection sticker?  [emphasis, added]

MS. BONOMO: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained, it’s been asked and answered already.

MR. ROSANO: So he didn’t mention it. [July 1, 2015 Tr. 51]

THE COURT: He did not mention the color of the sticker, that’s correct [emphasis, added] [Again by saying so the Court verified ab silencio that he lacked subject matter jurisdiction, added].

MR. ROSANO: That’s the reason why he stopped me. And that should have been included in the information [emphasis, added] [i.e. included in the supporting deposition, added].

THE COURT: No, sir. The color of the sticker tells him it was expired. He puts in the information that it was expired. That’s why he stopped you. The color is how he knows it was expired.

MR. ROSANO: That’s how he had authorization [emphasis, added].

THE COURT: Let’s move on to something else.

Q.  So that’s established, you didn’t put what the color of my inspection sticker?

THE COURT: Yes, it is [emphasis, added]. Let’s move on.”  [July 1, 2015 Tr. 51:11]

 

MR. ROSANO [July 1, 2015 Tr. 54:6 – 56:6]

 

Q. Is it - - when you fill out the informations, is it typically - - because you  mentioned  - - when you fill out informations like the one I showed you, is it typically that someone else does it and you sign it?

MS. BONOMO: Objection, your Honor.

Q. As a procedure? -

THE COURT: Overruled.

A.  That particular form we don’t fill out. Somebody else does.[Consequently it’s hearsay, added]

Q.  This particular one someone else filled out?  

A.  And I signed it after I review it.

Q.  Which means that you agreed to everything on there? [emphasis, added].

THE COURT: Where do they get the information that’s put in there?

THE WITNESS: I couldn’t tell you that. The summons clerk, this is for any kind of simplified traffic infraction. If somebody requests a supporting deposition, they prepare it, they leave it in your folder, you sign it [yet these words based on hearsay are exactly what the NYS legislature prohibits, added].

THE COURT: Did you have other - - would they [July 1, 2015 Tr. 55] look at your arrest report to get the information?

THE WITNESS: They might look at the actual traffic summons. 

THE COURT: Okay.

Q. So would it be safe to say they got this information on hearsay?

MS. BONOMO: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Q. In other words, they got the information that they had needed, they needed to have the information, and you agreed that you signed it as if it was you who prepared the application; is that correct? 

MS. BONOMO: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: He never said that he prepared it. He said that he signed it.

Q.  I’m saying, he signed it, which indicates that it would be just as if you had done it yourself?

MS. BONOMO: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Q.  But you didn’t prepare it, you just signed it (thereby pretending that you did prepare it, added).

A.  I reviewed it and I signed it once I realized it was accurate [emphasis, added].

Q. And it was pursuant to my request for a deposition? [July 1, 2015 Tr. 56] …

A. Yes.

THE COURT: There was a 100.25 request filed.

MR. ROSANO: That was in procedure.

THE COURT:  You filed a 100.25 demand, and you got a supporting deposition. 

MR. ROSANO: And that was it.” [July 1,2015 Tr. 56:6]

               

 

LEGAL ANALYSIS II:

 

                J.D.s #11 and #12 above refer to my arguments presented beforehand on June 15^th 2015 Tr. 4-6 when and where I asserted that all governments in the U.S.A. lack jurisdiction to do anything which was never disputed and thereby conceded by Judge Bjorneby precisely because all governmental employees’ GHI plans which cover abortion, contraception and/or sterilization are unconstitutional in violation of both the establishment and free exercise of religion clauses under the federal first amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Otherwise under J.D. #13, even before the criminal trial began I recognized and proved that NCDC lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on my above Alejandro analysis of the supporting deposition that I orally had presented at my trial on July 1, 2015!

Consequently, deceiving the American People that the NCDC had/has jurisdiction both ways while simultaneously denying e.g. my federal constitutional right to travel freely by automobile, my federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, etc., in a conspiracy with other NCDC judges, the arresting P.O., the ADA and defense attorney in question in turn NCDC Judge Eric Bjorneby committed federal crimes under 18 U.S.C. 242 which is but another emergency I sought to completely overcome that otherwise justified and thereby legitimized my three (3) acts of “civil disobedience” on March 9, 2015, and January 13, and August 23, 2016. In addition in NCDC Criminal Part 6, Judge Goodsell on my reconsideration motion, soon to be filed, I am entitled to raise another justification defense argument as a matter of law under PL 35.05 Subd. #1 and/or PL 35.05 Subd. #2 by raising an emergency under 18 U.S.C 242 that I, as of yet, have never raised before according to the following: On November 7, 1979 the U.S. Navy had the burden of proof to show that it took initial steps towards an accommodation for my Roman Catholic Religious practices in question regarding the FEHI plan offered then. See 29 C.F.R. 1605.2c as above mentioned.

Until the U.S. Navy takes initial steps towards a religious accommodation – which it has never done since November 7, 1979 - then in turn governmental liability is certain which thereby justifies at least my insubordination  between April 7, 1980 and May 30, 1980 if not then also criminal trespasses between 1986 & 2003, non-payment of both NC RE taxes and a NC RE tax lien in question besides anything else that has to do with a definition of a burden on the free exercise of religion, such as moreover e.g. the estate taxes my brother, Robert R. Rosano, and I had to pay for estate taxes on behalf of my Mother, Mary Rosano, who died on January 21, 1990. By reason, raising this new justification defense, the U.S. Navy bears the burden of showing in NYS criminal court why it didn’t pursue its official federal procedures under 29 C.F.R. 1605.2c that had been in place on & after November 7, 1979 until today!

Consequently any damages I suffered because the U.S. Navy failed to accommodate to my religious practices in question the U.S. Navy is liable for. For example, not only for lost wages and lost opportunities in earning a living but in addition the governmental liability continues on since had the U.S. Navy processed my beneficial suggestions in 1980, the national and state budgets would have been reduced by that amount which went to pay GHI coverage for abortion, contraception, sterilization, embryonic stem cell research, no less the funding thereof per se as well! As a byproduct to my religious discrimination complaint was and is reducing the national budget, as yet another emergency I sought to overcome by pursuing all my complaints. In 2004 I copyrighted my book titled HOW ABORTION WILL BECOME UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Conclusively the award of money I am entitled to collect from, should be at a higher percentage than if, the U.S. Government had processed my beneficial suggestion on my behalf in 1980; because pursuant to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.